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Northeast, the city described in the anthrax
scenario (Inglesby, this issue, pp. 556-60) is
actually Baltimore, a metropolitan area of 2
million population, with a football stadium that
holds 74,000. Route 95 would be where the
anthrax dispersion took place.
My test case started on February 13 at 6 a.m.
when I went to the emergency room at Johns
Hopkins University Hospital and asked to see
the physician in charge. I described the typical
case and asked what the procedure would be if a
patient came down with these symptoms. The
physician in charge had actually taken the
specialized 8-hour training course on bioterrorism
(one of five physicians in Maryland to have
completed this course entitled Train the
Trainer). Nevertheless, she confessed that the
typical early case of inhalation anthrax would
have a presumed diagnosis of flu, and the patient
would probably be sent home. Despite the
emphasis on emergency room physicians as the
early response team, the actual diagnosis
would be made after hospitalization. Many
seriously ill patients arriving at the same time
might arouse suspicion, but the initial cases
would likely be isolated events or would be
dispersed in multiple emergency rooms.
There was a further problem. At the time of
my visit, the emergency room was on blue alert,
meaning that all 28 beds were filled; the hospital
was also filled. Furthermore, the whole city was
on blue alert, probably because of the flu
epidemic. Hospitals routinely run on marginal
excess capacity. The pressures of managed care
have resulted in a health-care system that has
minimal elasticity, so on February 13, there were
no beds for an anthrax epidemic.
I then went to radiology; I showed the
radiologist a classic case of inhalation anthrax
and asked him how he would interpret the X-ray.
He said that he would read it as widened
mediastinum; the differential diagnosis did not
include anthrax.
Then I went to the laboratory and asked the
lead technician who has been in the laboratory
for 25 years. He said that Bacillus anthraxis had
never been isolated during his tenure. If it was
recovered in blood cultures, it would be called
Bacillus species, a probable contaminant.
However, more than three cases of Bacillus
species would prompt a full identification, which
would be available in 48 hours. That would
trigger a call to the chief of Infectious Disease
and to Infection Control. It would take 72 hours
to get sensitivity test resultswhich is
important since this information would drive the
subsequent decisions regarding antibiotic pro-
phylaxis to those patients or persons who had
been exposed. My own response (if given the
possibility of a case of inhalation anthrax) would
be to call the state health departmentthe
Maryland Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene.
I got a recording and left a message that I had
a query about bioterrorism, and it was
important. The call was returned 3 days later.
The state does have a response mechanism that
is far along in planning and can be activated with
a single phone call. The problem is that I did not
know the number. No one else seemed to know
the number; it is not in the hospital directory or
on 911 listings.
How were we set in Baltimore to deal with
antibiotics? What was the supply? At any
moment, the city of Baltimore had 69,000
capsules of ciprofloxicin and 99,000 capsules of
doxycycline. We could probably use a number of
other flouroquinolones, and if the sensitivities
proved that penicillin was active, we could use
that as well. Access to antibiotics would not be a
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major problem in this scenario of anthrax
contamination.
Then I reviewed the statewide facilities and
planning for a bioterrorist attack. One phone call
to the state health department would set into
motion a cascade of events that would include an
immediate effort by state epidemiologists to
review the data and confirm the diagnosis. They
would then contact the Maryland Emergency
Management Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Maryland Institute for Emer-
gency Medical Services System, and other
appropriate agencies. The Maryland Emergency
Medical Agency coordinates relevant state
agencies and also acts as spokesperson to the
press.
Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical
Services System has the capability for flash faxes
to emergency rooms throughout the state but
does not communicate with infection control
programs and other parts of the hospital because
somebody in the emergency room can always get
that information. My perception is that
Maryland does not have a good system to reach
its practicing physicians, whose involvement is
critical. To give antibiotics to tens or hundreds of
thousands of persons in several days, it will be
necessary to use more than the health
department clinics and personnel. Notification
and direction would have to be done through the
press and through the medical society, but it is
not clear how well this would work. There had
been a few examples, however, of how this
system would work in other settings. The
Maryland Emergency Medical Agency, the
system for public communication, is active about
two to three times a year, primarily for ice storms
and hurricanes. It has not been tested for a major
epidemic, but at least it is a system that is
established. The capacity for bodies in a morgue
would be approximately 100, but there are
contracts to get refrigerated trucks that would
hold 40 bodies per truck. The system is set up so
that Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical
Services System can readily identify bed capacity
for every hospital in Maryland including the
number of available intensive care unit beds to
facilitate referrals. No plan is available for
stockpiling antibiotics or vaccines. Stockpiling of
antibiotics is not necessary because the city could
get an adequate supply from regional sites, and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
has a $50 million budget allocated to this need.
The great need is for deploying antibiotics in an
expeditious way to thousands, presumably by
using regional care sites and the thousands of
physicians offices; 3,000 emergency medical
service providers could be available to assist, but
the mainstay of care in any large epidemic would
come from the private sector.
How does all this work? The good news is
that we have a system set up where there is one
person or one group that is coordinating the
events and one point of contact that initiates the
relevant cascade of events necessary for a
response. Can this system respond the way it is
expected to respond? The system has worked in
natural disasters, but it may break down in a
large outbreak of inhalation anthrax. For
example, during a pfisteria crisis, many groups
took the outbreak on as their issue. Representa-
tives of Congress and influential citizens
bypassed the governor, the mayor, the Maryland
Emergency Management Agency and every
other system to contact the White House, CDC,
other agencies and various medical experts to
deal with it. Many did not like the answers they
got, so they bypassed standard channels, and
many are unaware of the rules. A system with a
single voice for communication with the press
and providers is needed. The state has 13,000
beds, but a flu epidemic recently overwhelmed
hospital capacity, and this was not even a big
year for influenza. A recent large fire in
Baltimore demonstrated that the city could not
handle 100 casualties.
Finally, there is the issue of medical-care
personnel resources to respond. Maryland has
16,000 physicians, 262 members of the Infectious
Disease Society, and 400 emergency room
physicians; in addition, every hospital has
infection control personnel. In the event of a
bioterrorist attack, these will be the first
responders. They are the front line for patient
contact with the health system. They will
suspect or establish the diagnosis, develop
systems to regulate hospital flow, make
therapeutic policy, give treatment, and will
provide prophylactic antibiotics and vaccines.
Federal, state, and local health agencies play a
central role in planning but do not have the
facilities or field forces necessary to deal with
sick patients and the thousands who need
vaccines or antibiotics.
The gap in planning at the federal level has
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at the table. We anticipate two responses.
Different groups will make territorial claims on
the issue; infectious disease physicians will say
bioterrorism is what they are trained for,
infection control practitioners will claim that
epidemics are their special skill, emergency room
physicians will claim that they will be the first to
see those patients, and microbiologists will claim
that they make the diagnosis. All have a role, and
all should be included. The second response
seems diametrically opposed. We suspect that it
will be difficult to engender participation by
relevant groups, despite their claims regarding
discipline relevance. A bioterrorist attack is a
low-probability event for nearly all cities when
considered individually. Cleveland, Tulsa, or
Sacramento are unlikely targets, just as
Oklahoma City was an unlikely target. Medical
providers are busy, and most of us have
volunteered to the breaking point. It is not
surprising that the Train the Trainers sessions
on bioterrorism in Baltimore were attended by
only five emergency room physicians and no
representative of hospitals. Thus, enthusiastic
participation by the critical players from the
private sector is unlikely.
The major mechanism for recruitment is a
carrot or a stick. Possibilities include making
bioterrorism plans by hospitals a Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Organization require-
ment, requiring this in RRC selected training
programs, asking it on American Board of
Internal Medicine boards, and incorporating it in
medical school curricula. These possibilities
would increase visibility of the issue but would
not provide the proper regional training needed.
The resources that now total $20 million should
include an allocation to the private sector to
permit training and planning programs that
represent a true partnership between public and
private sources.
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